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Abstract
This study refers to interpretation as a speedy and 
effortless process through Levinson’s utterance-type-
meaning (1995, 2000). It applies Levinson’s heuristics (Q, 
I and M) to warrant the message accuracy and trigger the 
utterance meaning and function in more immediate and 
stereotypical manner. The heuristics were applied to the 
interpretation of a number of press conferences between 
Arabic and English. The heuristics as pragmatic principles 
of communication assist interpreters to produce a message 
that is most consistent with the speaker’s knowledge of 
the world or what s/he believes to be true, expand and 
compress the TM’s components as allocated in the SM, 
and communicate any reiterative, emotive, and persuasive 
functions through a similar level of markedness. 
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This study postulates that interpretation is an automatic 
and immediate decoding of meaning, particularly in 
contexts like international gatherings given the load of 
cognitive processing due to time constraints (Gillies, 
2014). Though Levinson’s account was criticized as 
“less flexible” (Bezuidenhout, 2002), and “questioned” 
in connection to the demanding cognitive processing of 
human communication in contrast to other accounts like 
RT (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) (cf. De Neys & Schaeken, 
2007; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck, 2001; Noveck 
& Posada, 2003; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003), I 
still believe that it can bring some interesting insights 
into interpretation through the notions of presumptive 
meaning and communication heuristics. In this paper, I 
will explain interpretation as an act of communication 
following Levinson’s heuristics of communication (1995, 
2000). The new account guides the interpreter to the best 
strategy to achieve communication with a higher level of 
immediacy, and lower degree of meaning and function 
loss. This research will consider Levinson’s heuristics 
in the interpretation of press conferences as a case of 
sensitive texts. If we consider these heuristics as part of 
Levinson’s theory of presumptive meaning (section two), 
that will allow us to look empirically at these heuristics 
with examples from press conferences interpreted between 
Arabic and English (section three). 
1. NEO-GRICEAN IMPLICATURE
What makes communication possible, Grice (1975) 
suggested, is a set of rules in form of a cooperative 
principle and a number of maxims (quantity, quality, 
relevance and manner). The cooperative principle assumes 
that communication is achieved when interlocutors 
contribute to conversation as required following the 
context and purpose of communication (Grice, 1975). The 
neo-Gricean account is reductionist in principle; that is, 
according to Chapman (2011), it tries to do the work of 
Grice’s theory of conversation, and at the same time bring 
the number of principles to the minimum to create a less 
complex and more motivated pragmatic framework. 
Levinson  (1995, 2000) proposed “a three-tiered theory 
of communication” (Huang, 2012, p.40) to understand 
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what is in the middle between a speaker meaning 
and sentence meaning. As an intermediary level of 
communication between conversational implicature that 
is context bound and propositional meaning, Levinson 
(1995, 2000) proposed “the utterance type meaning” 
as more automatic, conventional and stereotypical. 
His theory provides default heuristics as “frameworks 
of assumption that can be taken to amplify the coded 
content of messages in predictable ways” (Levinson, 
1995, p.96). Based on his presumption that human 
communication is speedy, effortless and efficient, 
Levinson (1995) suggests a number of heuristics. 
Such heuristics are default; that is according to him 
(1995, p.96), “they are applied unless there are explicit 
indications (in the nature of the context or the content 
of the message) that they should not be”. The three 
heuristics are Quantity (Q-Heuristic), Informativeness 
(I-Heuristic) and Manner (M-Heuristic). 
1.1 Q1: (Q-Heuristic)
Speakers and hearers according to Levinson (1995) 
presume that each other know that they should use this 
principle of communication; therefore, not everything 
they mean should be said. The speaker cannot make a 
statement informationally weaker than his knowledge of 
the world allows. The hearer, on the other hand, assumes 
that the speaker has made the strongest statement 
consistent with what he knows (cf. Bezuidenhout, 2002). 
For example, in the utterance ‘the flag is white’, the 
speaker implicates that the flag is only white, not red or 
blue. The Q-Heuristic is based on the contrast between 
sets of expressions that produce inferences of negative or 
complementary nature. The scalar pair “all” and “some” 
for example, has strong and weak forms. The strong 
form ‘all’ entails the weak form “some”. Consider the 
following example:
(a) All of the students were in class.
(b) Some of the students were in class.
“All of the students were in class” entails that “some 
of the students were in class”, and not vice versa. The 
hearer in (a) infers that the speaker’s utterance is not 
informationallly weaker than his/her knowledge of 
the world; therefore the hearer’s interpretation should 
be consistent with this assumption. So if the speaker 
implicates (b), the hearer should presume that the speaker 
should have said so. The entailment could apply to other 
cases as “and/or”, “since/if”, lexical items, such as “hot 
and warm”, modal adjectives such as “necessary and 
possible” , or even morphemes with certain grammatical 
meaning, such as the definite article “the”  and the 
indefinite article “a” (Levinson, 1995). 
1.2 The I-Heuristic
The I-Heuristic (I for informativeness, from Atlas and 
Levinson, 1981) minimizes what the speaker says when 
the hearer is able to expand the informational content of 
the speaker’s utterance. The hearer, on the other hand, 
amplifies or enriches the informational content of the 
speaker’s utterance up to the point where the hearer can 
figure out the speaker’s intention (cf. Bezuidenhout, 
2002). This heuristic relates to Grice’s second maxim of 
Quantity; it “takes us from the more general utterance to 
the most specific, most informative default interpretation” 
(Briner, 2003, p.83). According to this principle, the 
default interpretation of the utterance meaning comes 
primarily from the conventional and stereotypical state 
of the utterance itself. In the example “there’s a blue 
pyramid on the red cube” (Levinson, 2000), the utterance 
implies a direct contact between the cube and the surface 
where it is placed primarily through the preposition “on”. 
In another example by Levinson (2000), if I say “he 
opened the door”, he then opened the door in the normal 
or conventional way as everybody expects, not by using 
“crowbar or dynamite”. However, if the utterance were 
“he turned the handle and pushed open the door” then we 
imply then that it was not in the conventional or normal 
manner, but rather in a non-stereotypical manner. The 
last example suggests meanings like he opened the door 
with “extra speed or force”. The I-Heuristic assumes 
default and stereotypical interpretations to narrow down 
inferences (Riemer, 2015). For example, according to 
Levinon (1995), “kitchen knife” is assumed to be used 
in kitchen, not for cutting kitchen, “bread knives” are 
not made of bread, but for cutting bread, “steel knives” 
however are made of steel, not for cutting steal, “army 
knives” are used by the army, not for cutting army. All 
such cases are of “presumptive interpretation” that 
tries to compute meaning in “the most general fashion” 
(Levinson, 1995, p.100). 
1.3 The M-heuristic
The third heuristic (M-Heuristic) counteracts the second 
(I-Heuristic). To the speaker, this heuristic enjoins him/
her to use marked expressions to draw the hearer’s 
attention to something unusual or unexpected in the 
situation. To the hearer, it guides him/her to arrive at the 
interpretation as intended (cf. Bezuidenhout, 2002). This 
principle draws on Grice’s maxim of manner, particularly, 
“be perspicuous”, “avoid obscurity of expression” and 
“avoid prolixity”. If the second maxim implies default and 
stereotypical interpretation, the third one is counterfactual; 
that is, it suggests that stereotypical interpretations be 
avoided (Levinson, 2000). The choice of more ambiguous 
forms or elaborate constructions is intentional. Following 
our presumption that humans are rational beings; that 
is they make choices for a reason (Thomas, 1983); 
therefore the speaker tries to communicate something as 
less expected and more marked. The choice of double 
negatives for example as in “he is not unpredictable” 
implies not only the positive form “he is predictable”, but 
rather, he is predictable in a different way. Levinson (1995) 
suggests a number of examples to explain this heuristic. 
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The word “drink” in the utterance “I had a drink” is 
unmarked. Stereotypically, following the second heuristic, 
this implies alcoholic drink. The word “beverage” on 
the other hand when used in the same utterance is rather 
marked; it suggests a non-alcoholic drink. The utterance 
“John could solve the problem” is unmarked. Again using 
the second heuristic, it implies that he did. However, the 
utterance “John was able to solve the problem” as less 
predictable form is rather less expected. This utterance 
therefore implies something different; that is, John could 
solve the problem, but he did not.
2. HEURISTICS IN INTERPRETATION
Having encapsulated the heuristics as suggested by 
Levinson (1995, 2000), in the following section I should 
explain how the heuristics apply to interpretation. Each of 
the heuristics will be explained along with examples from 
some press conferences. The discussion should mark the 
interpreter’s selection of what elements to choose from to 
communicate meaning immediately and effortlessly. 
2.1 Q-Heuristic 
The Q-heuristic requires the speaker not to make weaker 
utterances than his/her knowledge of the world, and 
the hearer to take it by the speaker to have made the 
strongest statement of what s/he knows. The interpreter 
shifts roles, first as a hearer, and second as a speaker. As 
a hearer, s/he should not expect more than what is said 
by the SM speaker to be the case. As a second speaker, s/
he cannot say more than s/he had expected from the SM 
speaker. 
Text 1 below includes some instances compatible 
with the Q-Heuristic. This text is from a press conference 
between the former Egyptian President Hussni Mubarak, 
and the American president  Barak Obama.  The 
examples include cases of general vocabulary, number 
words, quantifiers and functional words. As a point 
of orientation, we should assume that Mubarak does 
not provide any statement weaker than his knowledge 
of the world allows. The interpreter, therefore, takes 
that the speaker has made the strongest statement that 
is consistent with the speaker’s world knowledge. 
Strong and weak forms illuminate our discussion of 
the applicability of the Q-Heuristic to interpretation. 
Accordingly, we can claim that interpretation is 
problematic if the interpreter opts for a weak form of the 
strong one or vice versa. (Where the interpreter in the 
examples fails the SL message, this should be pointed 









The third (h) time I meet with President Obama is 
right here at the White House. We have (talk… open…) 
discussed (a) an array (d) of issues, from our bilateral 
relations to the issue of the Middle East, the region, to 
the Palestinian issue, to the issue of Iran, Somalia and 
the Africa horn. Also, several (e) other issues even we 
discussed the issue of reform inside Egypt, and I told 
president Obama very frankly and very friendly that I 
have entered into the elections based on a platform (f) 
that included reforms we have started to implement and 
some we still have two (g) more years to implement. Our 
relations between us and the United States are very good 
(b) relations and strategic. We have perhaps focused on 
the Palestinian issue because it is a pivotal issue. The 
Palestinian issue has impact (c) on the world.
Examples of scalar implicature from Text 1:
(a) We discussed many topics (as interpreted).
	 □	not	talked	about	many	topics
(b)  The relations between America and Egypt are 
good and strategic
	 □	not	very	good	(as	interpreted)
(c) It has impacted the region (as interpreted)
	 □	not	affected	
(d) We discussed many topics
	 □	not	an	array	of	topics	(as	interpreted)
(e) All these issues
	 □	not	several	of	these	issues	(as	interpreted)
(f)  I entered into the elections based on a plan or a 
platform (as interpreted)
	 □	not	plan	and	platform
(g)  We still have two years to conclude them (as 
interpreted)
	 □	not	three	years	to	conclude	them
(h)  This is the third time I meet with President 
Obama (as interpreted)
	 □	not	the	fourth
Example (a) is a case of general vocabulary with 
strong scales that entail other words with weaker scales. 
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To be more specific, the verb “to discuss” implicates 
other verb forms like “to talk” or “to speak”. The 
cancelling formula “not only W (weak), S (strong)” by 
Levinson (2000) can apply to test which is which (strong 
vs. weak) as following: while “not only talked about a 
number of issues, but also discussed them” is acceptable, 
“not only discussed a number of issues, but also talked 
about them” is not. So, by applying the cancelling 
formula, “to discuss” is the strong form, and “to talk” 
is the weak form. The interpreter chose the strong form 
taking the speaker to have made this form consistent 
with his best knowledge of the world. The word “discuss” 
should communicate meanings such as “exchange, 
weigh up, argue for” particular views; such senses are 
not part of words such as “talk”, or “speak”. In example 
(b), the interpreter does not show a similar awareness of 
the strong and weak forms of the adjective form “good”. 
To test which is which, again, we can apply a similar 
cancelling formula by Levinson (2000). The formula “W 
even S” applies as following: The phrase “good even 
very good” is acceptable; the phrase “very good even 
good” is not. “Very good” therefore is the strong form, 
and “good” is the weak form. Therefore, contrary to the 
speaker’s intention, the message is being exaggerated 
as very good using the strong form instead of the weak 
marked form. This, therefore, is not consistent with the 
speaker’s intention. Here I should point out that has 
the speaker intended the strong form, he would have 
used the quantifier “very”. In Arabic, the word “ طةبي ”  
(roughly translates as good) is rather neutral. This sense 
therefore, in the Arabic text, implicates that the relations 
between Egypt and the U.S. have not yet improved 
to a natural level given some issues with the previous 
administrations. The interpretation of example (c) seems 
more consistent with the Q-Heuristic. In the example, 
the verbs “affect” and “impact” have a similar scalar 
implicature. The cancelling formula “W in fact S” by 
Levinson (2000) applies as following: while the phrase 
“affected, in fact, impacted” is acceptable, the phrase 
“impacted, in fact affected” is not. So, “to impact” is the 
strong form; it communicates meanings like “to firmly 
affect something”. It also carries senses like “strong” 
and “forcible” amongst others. 
In examples (d) and (e), the quantifiers “many” 
and “all” could implicate different scales of weak and 
strong forms. In example (d) the quantifier “an array 
of” is used for the quantifier “many”. Using Levinson’s 
(2000) suspending formula “W or even S”, the utterance 
“an array of, even many topics” seems acceptable, 
whereas the phrase “many, even an array of topics” is 
not. The quantifier “many” has been interpreted by using 
the weaker form “an array of”. The use of “an array 
of” instead of “many” communicates a less expected 
meaning. “An array of topics” implicates that the topics 
vary primarily in terms of kind, and secondarily in terms 
of quantity. In the text, there is no indication that most 
of the listed topics are mainly political. Similarly, in 
example (e)... “all” and “several” represent another case 
of scalar implicature as “all” is the strong form, and 
“several” is the weak one. Applying the suspension test 
“W if not S” by Levinson (2000), the phrase “several if 
not many issues” is more acceptable than “many if not 
several issues”. Again the choice of several as the weak 
form makes it more marked; it does not presume that the 
speaker has made the strongest proposition consistent 
with his knowledge of the world. This makes the hearer 
implicates other meanings which are not part of the 
message content as a more marked form. 
Morphology is another case of the scalar approach 
by Levinson (2000) following Horn (1972, 1984). 
Some cases are the closed class of linking words and 
the grammatical inflections that indicate tenses. A case 
of linking words from the press conference between 
Mubarak and Obama is given in example (f) as a more 
consistent interpretation with the Q-Heuristic. In this 
example, the connective “or” is inclusive; that is it 
communicates the strong form “and”. For example, “all 
monkeys are mean or all buffalos are brave” implicates 
that “one or the other, or both” (Briner, 2013). In example 
(f), “plan or platform” implicates “plan or platform, or 
both plan and platform”. Following this argument, the 
linking “or” is the strong form and the linking “and” is 
the weak form. The choice of “or” as the strong form is 
consistent with the speaker’s world knowledge; hence 
the interpretation is more accurate. Therefore, to interpret 
example (f) as “plan and platform” using the weak form 
“and” is less accurate. 
A similar kind of argument can be applied to number 
words and numerical expressions in examples (g) and 
(h). Consecutively, the number “two” and the numerical 
expression “third time” entail meanings like “at least two 
years” and “at least the third time”. Such forms therefore 
are not supposed to be problematic if noted accurately by 
the interpreter. 
The Q-Heuristic marks the highest stage of informative 
communication. Not applying this principle could mislead 
the audience by a faulty message. For example, in Text 
2, the Palestinian President Abbas and the former British 
Prime Minister Brown held a press conference in London 
in 2008. What is not said was the case in a number of 
utterances. The Arabic word “ نوممصم ” (determined) 
was relayed once as “emphasized” and another time as 
“sured (sic)”. This is a violation of the Q-Heuristic. The 
word “determine” has weaker forms like “decide”. It 
implicates meanings, amongst others, like “firm, decisive, 
forceful decisions”. “Emphasized” on the other hand does 
not implicate similar senses; it has completely different 
weaker forms. For example if you emphasize something, 
then you make it more prominent amongst other similar 
things. 
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In another example from Text 2, President Abbas 
only talked about Britain’s support to the Palestinian 
Authority, not to the Palestinian people as was reported 
in the interpretation. This leads to different kinds 
of meaning processing with unwanted, sometimes 
unwarranted consequences. West Bank and Gaza 
Strip are controlled by two factions that have different 
ideological orientations. The Palestinian Authority 
controls the West bank; it is predominantly controlled by 
the secular Fatah organization. Gaza Strip is controlled 
by Hamas; a sect of the Moslem Brotherhood that 
controlled The Strip after the military coup in 2006. The 
Palestinian people and Palestinian authority have whole-
part or strong-weak forms relationship. The relationship 
between the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian 
people is inclusive if the later is representative of the 
former; this enjoins a logical form like A or B, or both 
A and B. This kind of interpretation is most likely by 
the audience who are affiliated with Fateh faction that 
controls the West Bank. The other interpretation where 
the relationship between the Palestinian people and the 
Palestinian Authority is exclusive (either A or B, not A 
and B) is most likely by people who are affiliated with 
Hamas that controls Gaza Strip. Therefore, the interpreter 
has no choice but to translate what is as is following the 
Q-Heuristic. 
Text 2:
و ايناثهينيطسلفلا ةطلسلا معد لجا نم ايناطيرب هتمدق يذلا معدلا ىلع مآركشا نا دوا ... ىلع نوممصم نحنو
 ماع يف لداع ملاس ىلا لوصولا2008 
 
I would like also to thank you for the generous 
support that you have been giving to Palestinian 
people and the Authority … We are emphasizing and we 
are sured (sic) that we will reach an agreement hopefully 
in 2008.
2.2 The I-Heuristic
The I-Heuristic is both speaker- and listener-based. The 
speaker minimizes the utterance to its minimal units, 
and the listener expands it again. The interpreter has to 
perform both tasks; as a listener, s/he knows what the 
intended meaning is through a process of maximization 
of language meaning. As a speaker, s/he renders the 
message by compacting its meaning in form of minimal 
units into the TL. The message by the interpreter as a 
second speaker, following Levinson (2000), should be 
specific, minimal, stereotypical and informative. This 
requires that the interpreter expands the message as a 
first hearer and compresses it again as a second speaker. 
The enrichment of the message as rendered in the TL 
should be automatic and immediate by the second hearer 
or the audience of the conference. Consider the examples 
(a) to (c) from the conferences between Mubarak and 
Obama (Text 1 above), and between the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron and the Egyptian President al-
Sissi (Text 3 below):
Text 3
 
interpretation is most likely by the audience who are affiliated with Fateh faction that controls 
the West Bank. The other interpretation where th  relationship between t e Palestinian people 
and the Palestinian Authority is exclusive (either A or B, not A and B) is most likely by people 
who are affiliated with Hamas that controls Gaza Strip.Therefore, the interpreter has no choice 
but to translate what is as is the case, and not as he thinks it should be following the Q-Heuristic. 
 
Text 2 
و ايناثهينيطسلفلا ةطلسلا معد لجا نم ايناطيرب هتمدق يذلا معدلا ىلع مآركشا نا دوا ... ملاس ىلا لوصولا ىلع نوممصم نحنو
 ماع يف لداع2008 
 
I would like also to thank you for the generous support that you have been giving to 
Palestinian people and the Authority … We are emphasizing and we are sured (sic) that we 
will reach an agreement hopefully in 2008 
2.2 The I-Heuristic 
The I-Heuristic is both speaker- and listener-based. The speaker minimizes the utterance to its 
minimal units, and t e listener expands it again. The interpreter has to perform both tasks; as a 
listener,s/he knows what the intended meaning is through a process of maximization of language 
meaning. As a speaker, s/he renders the message by compacting its meaning in form of minimal 
units into the TL.The message by the interpreter as a second sp aker, following Levinson (2000) 
should be specific, minimal, stereotypical and informative. This requires that the interpreter 
expands the message as a first hearer and compress it again as a second speaker. The enrichment 
of the message as rendered in the TL should be automatic and immediate by the second hearer or 
the audience of the conference. Considerthe examples(a) t  (c) from the conf rences between 
Mubarak and Obama (Text 1 above), between the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the 
Egyptian President al-Sissi (Text 3 below): 
 
Text 3: 
ارزولا سلجم سيئر ةماخف اركش  
 تاديسلاوولا سيئر ةلودل ريدقتلاو ركشلاهجوا هيادبلا يف يل وحمسا هداسلاز هرايزلا هذه دوست يتلا هيباجيلاا ءاوجلاا ىلع يناطيربلا ءار
 ىلعوهفايضلا مرآولابقتسلاا ةوافح )a( يناطيربلا بناجلا اهيدبي يتلا  
 سكعت هدحتملا ةكلملل يترايزتاقلاعلا ةوقنيبعشلاو نيدلبلا نيب طبرت يتلا ,نوقفتت مكنا)c(  يتلا هقيثولا نواعتلا تاقلاع نا ىلع يعم
يف عمجت لثمت ىتش تلااجم يف اننيب امانيتم اساسا هآارش ميعدتو هيداصتقلااو ةيسايسلا تاقلاعلا ريوطت نم بيرقلا لبقتسملا يف انل حيتي
قاطنلا ةعساو هيرامستساو هيراجت ... للاخ نم اننأ كشلاو ،تارواشملا )b( ربآأ ًامهف ققحنس 
Interpretation 
Thank you Mr Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen. As well as the hospitality(a) and the 
welcomewe have received from Britain.  
My visit to the UK clearly reflects the strong relationsbetween the two countries and 
peoples. I think you agree(c) with me that our close co-operation in the various fields lays the 
sound foundationfor more rigorous dynamics politically and economically, as well as trade and 
Interpretation: 
Thank you Mr Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen. 
As well as the hospitality (a) and the welcome we have 
received from Britain. 
My visit to the UK clearly reflects the strong relations 
between the two countries and peoples. I think you 
agree (c) with me that our close c operation in the 
various fields lays the sound foundation for more rigorous 
dynamics politically and economically, as well as trade 
and investment partnership at a wider scale… No doubt 
we have come out from these talks (b) with better 
understanding.
Examples:
(a) I thank you for the hospitality.
 + > your hospitability to us
(b)  Through consultations, we have come to better 
understanding 
 + > consultations between us
(c)  Our r lations between us and the Unite  St tes (as 
interpreted) (Text 1).
Examples (a) and (b) are cases of co-referencing. 
In example (a), the utterance “I thank you for the 
hospitability and the positive atmosphere” undergoes 
enrichment and expansion by the interpreter as a first 
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hearer as following: “I (president al Sissi) thank you 
(President Cameron, British delegation) for your 
(Cameron’s, the British delegation’s) hospitability (to me 
and my delegation).” Similarly, example (b) “through 
consultations, we have come to better understanding” 
is expanded as “through consultations (between us, al 
Sissi and Cameron) we (both of us) have come to better 
understanding (about the concerned issues)”. Such 
expanded processing is compressed by the interpreter 
as a second speaker, and then expanded again upon the 
rendition of the message by the TL audience. Applying 
this principle saves the interpreter extra processing of the 
message meaning to avoid redundancy and information 
load. In example (c), however, the interpreter performs 
the first phase of the message processing (enrichment), 
but fails to compact the message upon rendition. The 
utterance “ هيكيرملاا هيرصملا تاقلاعلا  ” (literally: The 
Egyptian-American relations) was interpreted as “Our 
relations between us and the United States”. The failure 
to apply this principle which is supposed to be automatic 
results in a more detailed and unnecessary processing of 
information and ends as a more redundant utterance. 
2.3 The M principle
This principle advises interpreters to consider marked 
utterances and amount of information as indicators to 
marked situations. Marked forms according to Levinson 
(2000) have two sides: the formal side and the meaning 
side. On the formal side they are morphologically 
complex, less lexicalized, prolix, less frequent and less 
neutral. On the meaning sides, they have additional 
meaning or connotation that does not exist in their 
unmarked counterparts. The heuristic according to 
Levinson (2000) relates to Grice’s maxim of manner; 
more particularly the sub-maxim “avoid prolixity”. More 
prolixic utterances as a case of flouting this sub-maxim 
increases the markedness of the utterance. Therefore 
the interpreter should communicate the same amount 
of information as in the SM to help the TL hearers to 
enjoin similar implicature. In particular cases a speaker 
emphasizes a point by giving more information than 
seems required in form of moves or additional chunks 
of information. In Text 1 above, Mubarak mentioned 
a number of topics he discussed with Obama as the 
parliamentary elections in Egypt. This topic is followed 
by 5 moves, unlike the other topics in the same 
utterance. Mubarak mentioned the platform (a) and made 
the word “pledge” appear synonymous (b); he remarked 
to the changes included in this platform (c), emphasized 
that the government is working on some reforms (d) 
and pointed that the government still needs more two 
years to finish them (e). This markedness through the 
amount of information has implications if we consider 
the political context of the conference. The meeting with 
Obama came just before the spark of the “Arab Spring” 
in Tunisia and after the controversial parliamentary and 
presidential elections in Egypt. Thus, the talk about 
reform with prolixity has a calming or sedative effect, 
particularly a message to the Egyptian people who 
started to feel unrest because of corruption, inequality 
and the rule of the military. What is considerable about 
this example is the interpreter failling the same amount 
of information in this utterance and thus missing the 
desired effect it has. 
Another example to explain prolixity as a case of 
markedness is the press conference between the American 
president Barak Obama and the Iraqi prime Minster 
Haider al-Abadi in Text 4 below. Again to understand 
the example, we need to consider the political context 
of the meeting. In the war against ISIL (the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant), there was a mention of the 
Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces in the midst of the 
controversy about the role of the Iraqi Forces in the war 
against ISIL. The Popular Forces are almost exclusively 
Shiites who were redeployed to stop ISIL from controlling 
more Iraqi territories. The Popular Mobilization Forces in 
the war against ISIL were accused of being sectarian and 
committing crimes against the Sunnis of Iraq under the 
pretext of fighting ISIL. In the example the mention of 
Popular Mobilization Forces seemed rather coincidental. 
However, with prolixity, this communicates a different 
function. Al-Abadi was talking about the battle of 
Ramadi. Exclusively, his mention of the Popular Forces 
was supplemented with four moves as follows: they are 
“under the control of the State (a)” and “under the control 
of the general chief of the Iraqi forces (b)” “completely 
(c)” and “now (d)”. Prolixity in this case implicates a 
message to President Obama and the Iraqi people that the 
Popular Forces have legitimacy as part of the Iraqi Army. 
The Iraqi prime minister was trying to change a previous 
misconception or defy an implicit claim about the role 
of such forces in the war against ISIL. This message was 
not clear in the TM. The interpretation was not upgraded 
to the same extent as the SM. Besides, the interpreter 
failed to indicate that the moves are made to give 
legitimacy to the Popular Mobilization Forces only, not, 
as in the interpretation, the Iraqi forces and the Popular 
Mobilization Forces together. 
Text 4:
 
and made the word “pledge” appear synonymous (b); he remarked the changes included in this 
platform (c), emphasized that the government is working onsome reforms (d) and pointed that the 
government till needs mor  wo year  to finish them (e). This markedness through the amount of 
information has implications if we considerthe political context of the conference.The meeting 
with Obama came just before the spark of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia and after the 
controversial parliament ry and pr sidential elections in Egypt. Thus, the talk ab ut reform with 
prolixity has a calming or sedative effect, particularly a message to the Egyptian people who 
started to feel unrestbecause of corruption, inequality and the rule of the military.What is 
considerable about this example is the interpreter failed the same amount of information in this 
utterance and missed the desired effect it has. 
 
Another example to explainprolixity as a case of markedness is the press conference between 
the American president Barak Obama and the Iraqi prime Minster Haider al-Ab di in Text 4 
below. Again to understand the example, we need to consider the political c ntext of the meeting. 
In the war against ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), there was a mention of the 
Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces in the midst of the controversy about the role of the Iraqi 
Forces in the war against ISIL. Th  Popular Forc s are almost exclusively Shiites who were
redeployed to stop ISIL from controlling more Iraqi territories. The Popular Mobilization Forces 
in the war against ISIL were accused of being sectarian and committing crimes against the 
Sunnis of Iraq under the pretext f fighting ISIL. In the example the mentionof Popular 
Mobilization Forces see ed rather coincidental. However, with prolixity, this communicates a 
different function.Al-Abadi was talking about the battle of Ramadi. Exclusively, his mention of 
the Popular Forces was supplemented with four moves as follows: they are“under the control of 
the St te ( )” and “under the control of the general chief of the Iraqi forces (b)”“com le ely 
(c)”and “now (d)”. Prolixity in this case implicatesa message to President Obama and the Iraqi 
people that the Popular Forces have legitimacy as part of the Iraqi Army.The Iraqi prime minister 
was trying to change a previo s misconception or defy an implicit claim about the role of such 
forc s in the war against ISIL.T is message was t clear in the TM. The interpretation was not 
upgraded to the same extent as the SM. Besides, the interpreter failed to indicate that the moves 
are given to elaborate the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces only, not, as in the 
interpretation, the I aqi forces and the popular mobiliza ion fo ces together.  
 
Text 4 
 شعاد دض كراعم ةدع ضوخنو انضخ انحا …  كراعلا هذه نم ةدحاو …   عم هلوجلا انحبر نحن كراعملا هذه لآ يف
حلا اهنمض نم ةيقارعلا تاوقلا يدامرلا دعب اتقوم اللهاءاش نا لوقا انا سب انرسخو يدامرلا يه اهنم هدحاو نكلو شعادش د
لماكلاب نلاا ةيقارعلا هلودلا ةرطيس تحتو هحلسملا تاوقلل ماعلا دئاقلا ةرطيس تحت يه يللا يبعشلا  ذخا ىرخا ةرم دعا
يدامرلا ةحاسم نم فاعضا ةدع لداعت ضرلاا نم تاحاسم ريرحت متو ةردابملا مامز. 
 
We arefighting several fights andcombats against ISIl.We have won rounds against ISIl .One 
ound we lost was i  Ramadi, but I say that we lost it only temporarily and the Iraqi Security 
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Interpretation:
We are fighting several fights and combats against ISIl. 
We have won rounds against ISIl . One round we lost was 
in Ramadi, but I say that we lost it only temporarily and the 
Iraqi Security Forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces 
all under the leadership of the commander in chief and 
the leadership of the Iraqi government has taken control 
of the situation and are endeavoring very hard to liberate all 
the land in Iraq that is confiscated.
Other examples of markedness are given in Text 3 
(above) and Text 5 (below) in form of repetitive semantic 
and lexical items. Such forms are used to emphasize 
a message; therefore they are heavier and longer than 
expected (cf. Dickens et al., 2013). Some examples as I 
interpreted are:
(a) Hearty reception
 + > extraordinary reception
(b) Generous hospitability
 + > abnormal hospitability
(c) Tight relations that combine both of us
 + > inseparable relations
(d) Firm foundations
 + > unshakable foundations
(e)  We  s t i l l  r e m e m b e r  w i t h  g r a t i t u d e  a n d 
appreciation your last historical visit
 + > unforgettable visit
Text 5:
 
Forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces all under the leadership of the commander in 
chief and the leadership of the Iraqi government has taken control of the situation and are 
endeavoring very hard to liberate all the land in Iraq that is confiscated.. 
 
Other examples of markedness are given in Text 3(above)and Text 5 (below) in form of 
repetitive semantic and lexical items. Such forms are used to emphasize amessage; therefore they 
are heavier and longer than expected (cf. Dickens et al., 2013). Some examples as I interpreted 
are: 
(a) Hearty reception 
+   extraordinary reception 
(b) Generous hospitability 
+ � abnormal hospitability 
(c)Tight relations that combine both of us 
+ � inseparable relations 
(d) Firm foundations 
+ � unshakable foundations 
(e) We still remember with gratitude and appreciation your last historical visit 
+ � unforgettable visit 
 
Text 5 
 ريدقتلاز زازتعا لكب رآذتي  ينيطسلفلا انبعش لازلاو انلزاموزةيخيراتلا مكتراي)e ( يتلاو ةينيطسلفلا يضارلاا ىلا اهب متمق يتلا انادب اهنم
يريآ نوج ديسلا اضيا ةدعاسمز مكتدعاسمو مكمعدب تاضوافملا قلاطا 
 
We still and our people still remember very proudly the historical visit(e) that you paid to 
the Palestinian territories after of which peace negotiations with your support and help and also 
with the evolvement of Mr Kerry.    
 
The choice of emphatic forms in form of heavy utterances in the examples(a) to (e) above is 
reiterative. Using the M-Heuristic, they all communicate a sense of unexpectedness through 
upgrading or negating the neutral, less marked and more expected forms like “ordinary”, 
“normal”, “separable”, “shakable” and “forgettable”. Such forms are rhetorical and persuasive 
with a function to invoke emotions by the audience to achieve the intended discourse goals as 
planned by the SM speaker. According to Jawad, (2009, p.736) “rhetorical repetition can be 
considered an extra structure, extra layer, or extra regularity aimed at triggering extra meanings 
as well as organizing the overall composition of discourse”.Jawad suggests different strategies 
totranslate repetition like reduction, repetition, omission etc. Here I will not argue for their 
applicability as good or bad strategies; however I find myself inclined to follow a similar 
argument about the feasibility of translation theory in relevance to Levinson’s heuristics similar 
to Gutt (1989).Translators according to this account should gear the TL audience to the 
maximization of optimal relevance to communicate the speaker’s intended meaning. 
 
Interpretation:
We still and our people still remember very proudly the 
historical visit (e) that you paid to the Palestinian territories 
after of which peace negotiations with your support and 
help and also with the evolvement of Mr Kerry. 
The choice of emphatic forms in form of heavy 
utterances in the examples (a) to (e) above is reiterative. 
Using the M-Heuristic, they all communicate a sense of 
unexpectedness through upgrading or negating the neutral, 
less marked and more expected forms like “ordinary”, 
“normal”, “separable”, “shakable” and “forgettable”. 
Such forms are rhetorical and persuasive with a function 
to invoke emotions by the audi nce to achieve the 
intended discourse goals as planned by the SM speaker. 
According to Jawad, (2009, p.736) “rhetorical repetition 
can be considered an extra structure, extra layer, or extra 
regularity aimed at triggering extra meanings as well as 
organizing the overall composition of discourse”. Jawad 
suggests different strategies to translate repetition like 
reduction, repetition, omission etc. Here I will not argue 
for their applicability as good or bad strategies; however 
I find myself inclined to follow a similar argument 
about the feasibility of translation theory in relevance to 
Levinson’s heuristics similar to Gutt (1989). Translators 
according to this account should gear the TL audience to 
the maximization of optimal relevance to communicate 
the speaker’s intended meaning.
CONCLUSION
This study triggers interpretation as an act of communication. 
It establishes for an act of interpretation characterized 
with immediacy, conventionality and effortlessness. 
The study applied Levinson’s (1995, 2000) heuristics, 
namely the Q, I and M heuristics. From the examples, 
the Q-Heuristic stipulates that an interpreter chooses 
the forms that are more consistent with the speaker’s 
knowledge of the world unless otherwise is stated. A scalar 
approach according to Levinson (1995, 2000) following 
Horn (1972, 1984) was used to examine some instances 
of vocabulary, morphology and linking words from a 
number of interpreted press conferences. The cases do 
not show much consistency according to the Q-Heuristics 
as some strong forms are replaced by weak forms and 
vice versa. The shift between strong and weak forms 
ends with a completely or partially different message 
with a different implicature. The I-Heuristic advocates 
that a linguistic form should be simply described through 
default maximization and compression. The interpreter 
ccording to the I-heuristic should expand the message as 
simply stated upon comprehension and compress it again 
upon rendition. The examples in the study show some 
instances compatible with the I-Heuristics; others that 
are less consistent with the I-Heuristic implicate different 
a meani g from what is intended. Extra infor ation 
and unconventional choice of words mainly implicate 
reiterative, emotive, and persuasive functions. The 
interpreter should be sensitive to any extra regularity in 
th  m s age form as this implicates a level of markedness 
and therefore meaning unconventionality. Thus, the 
amount of information or message prolixity should be 
marked in a very similar way to communicate similar 
functions. 
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